Executive Summary
This paper proposes a constitutionally grounded mechanism for addressing systematic abuse of the presidential pardon power to shield federal officers from accountability for misconduct committed in an official capacity. Rather than attempting to limit the pardon power directly—an approach requiring constitutional amendment and politically implausible—this proposal relies on Congress's Article I legislative authority to eliminate judge-made immunity doctrines that obstruct state enforcement in precisely defined circumstances: when a president pardons a federal officer for federal crimes arising from conduct that violates state law.
The central claim is unambiguous: When a president exercises clemency to shield a federal officer from federal accountability for conduct that violates state criminal law, Congress may exercise its constitutional authority as a coordinate branch to ensure state accountability mechanisms cannot be similarly obstructed by federal judge-made immunity doctrines.
This is not an ordinary immunity elimination. This is Congress exercising explicit constitutional authority to check presidential abuse through the enforcement powers reserved to the states. Congress declares that federal officer immunity—created by courts without explicit authorization—shall not apply in civil or criminal cases where: (1) a federal officer has been pardoned for federal crimes, and (2) the underlying conduct violates state law. In these circumstances, both state criminal prosecution and state civil liability proceed unobstructed by federal immunity doctrines.
This restores constitutional balance: when the Executive uses the pardon to evade federal accountability, Congress activates state accountability mechanisms as a structural check on executive power abuse.
I. The Constitutional Crisis
A. The Pardon Power Absolutism Problem
Article II grants the President power to "grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment." The Supreme Court has declared this power nearly absolute and effectively unreviewable.
Yet the Framers could not have anticipated the specific scenario now emerging: a president systematically using the pardon to shield officers from federal accountability for crimes committed in pursuit of executive policy, thereby rendering both federal AND state accountability mechanisms inoperative.
Here is the structural failure:
- Federal prosecution is declined or fails
- President pardons federal crimes
- Federal courts decline to review the pardon (it is unreviewable)
- Federal officer claims immunity from state prosecution
- Federal courts block state proceeding on supremacy/immunity grounds
- Federal judge-made doctrines render state accountability impossible
- Result: complete impunity
The president has weaponized clemency not as mercy, but as a mechanism to shield misconduct from all accountability—federal and state.
B. Judicial and Legislative Abdication
Two branches have failed to check this:
The Judicial Branch: Federal courts have expanded immunity doctrines to shield federal officers from state enforcement. These are judge-made doctrines—Bivens immunity, qualified immunity extended to state proceedings, official-capacity preemption doctrines—created without constitutional mandate. Courts have used these doctrines to systematically prevent states from enforcing their own criminal law against federal officers.
The Legislative Branch: Congress has permitted this expansion through silence. Congress never explicitly authorized Bivens immunity. Congress never mandated that federal officers be shielded from state criminal law. Yet Congress has tolerated the judicial expansion of immunity doctrines.
When the Executive abuses clemency while both coordinate branches fail to check it, Congress must act.
C. Why Direct Pardon Limits Fail
A constitutional amendment is politically impossible. Impeachment is episodic and backward-looking. Ordinary state prosecution under current doctrine is blocked by federal immunity and supremacy doctrines.
The solution is not to attack the pardon power directly. The solution is to eliminate the federal judge-made immunity doctrines that have made the pardon effective as a shield against state accountability.
Congress does this as an explicit check on executive abuse—precisely what separation of powers demands.
II. Congressional Authority to Eliminate Federal Immunity as a Check on Executive Abuse
A. Congress's Role as a Coordinate Branch
The Constitution establishes three coequal branches. Each has authority to check the others. The Framers specifically designed the system so that when one branch abuses power, other branches can respond.
When the Executive abuses clemency, Congress must have the authority to respond.
Congress possesses plenary authority to:
- Eliminate judge-made doctrines courts created without explicit authorization
- Define the scope and application of immunity for federal officers
- Determine when federal law preempts state law
- Specify when federal interests override state police power
- Create structural checks on executive power abuse
This is not a new claim. Congress regularly exercises this authority.
B. Bivens Doctrine Is Judge-Made, Not Constitutional
Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), created an implied federal cause of action for constitutional violations. This was not mandated by the Constitution. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that Bivens is judge-created doctrine that Congress may alter or eliminate.
The immunity doctrines built on Bivens—qualified immunity, official-capacity immunity, the extension of such immunity to state proceedings—are not constitutional requirements. They are judicial choices.
Congress has plenary authority to eliminate judicial choices about when immunity exists.
C. The Pardon as Catalyst: The Specific Congressional Power
Congress's authority is especially clear and urgent when a president exercises clemency. Here is why:
The presidential pardon is an Article II power that Congress cannot directly limit. However, Congress can respond to pardon abuse by securing alternative accountability mechanisms. When a pardon eliminates federal accountability, Congress may ensure state accountability mechanisms function—by eliminating federal immunity doctrines that obstruct state enforcement.
This is not Congress attacking the pardon power. This is Congress securing accountability mechanisms when the pardon threatens to render all mechanisms inoperative.
Congress's authority here is explicit: Congress is exercising the constitutional duty to check executive abuse through the enforcement powers available to the states.
D. State Criminal Law and Civil Liability Are Core State Powers
State criminal law enforcement and state tort liability are at the absolute core of state sovereignty. The Constitution does not grant the federal government general police power or tort authority. States retain inherent authority to:
- Prosecute crimes under state law
- Impose civil liability under state law
- Protect their citizens from abuse of power
Federal immunity doctrines that prevent state enforcement are judge-made obstructions to reserved state power. Congress can eliminate them.
III. The Mechanism: Immunity Elimination as a Check on Executive Clemency Abuse
A. The Triggering Principle
Congress declares that when the following circumstances converge, federal immunity doctrines shall not apply in state civil or criminal proceedings:
- A federal officer has been issued a presidential pardon for federal crimes; AND
- The underlying conduct that was pardoned also violates state criminal law or state tort law
In these circumstances—where presidential clemency has eliminated federal accountability—Congress activates state accountability mechanisms by eliminating federal immunity obstructions.
B. Both Civil and Criminal Application
This immunity elimination applies to BOTH:
Criminal Cases: State criminal prosecution proceeds without federal immunity defenses. Federal officer immunity, qualified immunity, official-capacity immunity—all are eliminated.
Civil Cases: State civil actions (tort, wrongful death, civil rights under state law) proceed without federal immunity defenses. State courts have full authority to impose civil liability for state law violations.
Why Both Matter: A pardon eliminates only federal criminal liability. A federal officer might escape federal prosecution but face federal civil liability. Federal immunity doctrines currently shield against state civil liability as well. By eliminating immunity in both contexts when a pardon has been issued, Congress ensures that at least one accountability mechanism (state civil or criminal) remains operational.
C. The Accountability Cascade
Once a presidential pardon is issued for federal crimes:
- State criminal prosecutors may proceed with state charges
- Defendant cannot claim federal immunity
- State civil plaintiffs may proceed with state tort actions
- Defendant cannot claim federal immunity
- State courts apply state law without federal immunity interference
- Full state accountability mechanisms activate
IV. The Proposed Legislative Framework
(Illustrative: The Pardon Accountability and Federalism Protection Act)
A. Congressional Findings and Purposes
Congress finds and declares:
(1) The presidential pardon power is an Article II power that Congress cannot directly limit, overturn, or condition;
(2) This Act does not penalize, burden, or condition the President's exercise of the pardon power. It neither invalidates nor limits the legal effect of any pardon. It addresses only the allocation of immunity and preemption doctrines that exist independently of the pardon power;
(3) When federal criminal accountability has been conclusively extinguished through presidential pardon, the constitutional allocation of power necessarily returns primary accountability for unlawful conduct to the states, absent congressional interference with state sovereignty;
(4) Federal officer immunity doctrines—including qualified immunity, official-capacity immunity, and immunities derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents—were created by courts without explicit congressional authorization;
(5) These judge-made doctrines have been extended to prevent state criminal prosecution and state civil liability against federal officers, thereby obstructing reserved state powers;
(6) This represents a structural failure: the unilateral exercise of pardon authority, combined with federal judge-made immunity doctrines, creates complete impunity for federal misconduct while leaving the Constitution bereft of any functioning accountability mechanism;
(7) State criminal law enforcement and state tort liability are core reserved powers of the states under the Tenth Amendment and fundamental to constitutional federalism;
(8) Because the President's pardon authority extends only to offenses against the United States, the extinction of federal criminal liability through pardon necessarily returns primary accountability responsibility to the states as the only remaining constitutional pathway;
(9) Congress possesses constitutional authority, as a coordinate branch of government, to reallocate accountability responsibilities and to eliminate federal judge-made immunity doctrines that obstruct this return to state authority when federal accountability has been affirmatively extinguished;
(10) This reallocation is not punishment of the pardon power; it is restoration of the constitutional order when the pardon has unilaterally altered the accountability landscape;
(11) Congress now exercises this authority as a structural check on the combined effect of presidential clemency and federal judicial immunity expansion, ensuring the Constitution retains a functioning accountability mechanism even when federal mechanisms have been foreclosed;
(12) This Act responds to a constitutional condition (absence of all accountability), not to the President's exercise of power (the pardon itself).
B. Operative Provisions
Section 1: Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "Pardon Accountability and Federalism Protection Act."
Section 2: Immunity Elimination Upon Extinction of Federal Criminal Accountability
(a) Triggering Condition. When a federal officer or employee has received a presidential pardon such that federal criminal accountability for specified conduct has been conclusively extinguished, and such underlying conduct also constitutes a violation of state criminal law or state tort law, the following subsections apply. The issuance of a pardon is used herein as an evidentiary and structural marker of the extinction of federal accountability, not as a basis for penalizing, burdening, or conditioning the pardon power itself.
(b) Elimination of Federal Immunity in Criminal Proceedings. In any state criminal prosecution of such federal officer for state law violations arising from conduct for which federal pardon was issued, no federal immunity doctrine shall apply, including:
(1) Qualified immunity under any federal statute or judge-made doctrine; (2) Official-capacity immunity or sovereign immunity as applied to federal officers; (3) Immunity derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or cases decided thereunder; (4) Any other federal common law immunity doctrine; (5) Any federal supremacy or preemption doctrine that would shield the defendant from state criminal prosecution.
(c) Elimination of Federal Immunity in Civil Proceedings. In any state civil action (including but not limited to tort, wrongful death, civil rights, and other state law claims) against such federal officer for state law violations arising from conduct for which federal pardon was issued, no federal immunity doctrine shall apply. The same immunity doctrines listed in subsection (b) are eliminated in civil context.
(d) Scope of Immunity Elimination. This section applies to:
(1) All federal officers, employees, and agents; (2) All state criminal offenses arising from pardoned conduct; (3) All state civil actions arising from pardoned conduct; (4) Conduct undertaken in official capacity, pursuant to federal policy, or at direction of federal superiors; (5) Both prospective and retrospective applications (see section on temporal application).
Section 3: Non-Preemption of State Law
(a) Congress declares that federal law does not preempt state criminal or civil enforcement against federal officers for state law violations when a presidential pardon has been issued for underlying federal crimes.
(b) No presumption of federal preemption shall apply.
(c) State criminal and civil law applies to federal officers with the same force it applies to all persons within the state's jurisdiction, absent express congressional preemption enacted after this Act.
Section 4: Prohibition on Federal Removal and Federal Defenses
(a) Removal Prohibition. State criminal prosecutions or state civil actions covered by this Act shall not be removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1442, or any other statute. Any removal petition shall be summarily denied and the action remanded to state court.
(b) Federal Defenses Inapplicable. Defendants in state proceedings covered by this Act may not raise as defense:
(1) Federal officer status or immunity; (2) Acting pursuant to federal policy or directive; (3) Presidential pardon (which applies only to federal offenses); (4) Federal supremacy or preemption doctrines.
(c) Judicial Review Limitation. No federal court may review a state court judgment in cases covered by this Act on the basis of federal immunity or preemption doctrines. However, federal courts retain authority to review for constitutional violations under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Section 5: Presidential Pardon Irrelevance in State Proceedings
Presidential pardons shall have no effect whatsoever in state criminal or civil proceedings. State courts shall not recognize presidential pardon as a defense, ground for dismissal, basis for mitigation, or ground for stay of proceedings in any state criminal prosecution or civil action governed by this Act.
Section 6: Constitutional Rights Preserved
(a) Nothing in this Act eliminates, limits, or diminishes any constitutional right, protection, or defense available under the United States Constitution or applicable state constitutions.
(b) Federal officers retain all constitutional defenses in state proceedings, including but not limited to:
(1) Due process rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) First Amendment protections; (3) Confrontation Clause rights; (4) Right to counsel; (5) All other constitutional protections applicable to criminal defendants.
(c) States must recognize constitutional defenses in civil and criminal proceedings.
Section 7: Definition of "Pardon"
For purposes of this Act, "presidential pardon" includes:
(1) Full pardon; (2) Commutation of sentence; (3) Any clemency action that reduces or eliminates federal criminal liability; (4) Pardon for any federal crime arising from the same conduct.
Section 8: Temporal Application
(a) Prospective. This Act applies to all pardons issued after the date of enactment and to state proceedings commenced after such date.
(b) Retrospective Proceedings. States may pursue state criminal prosecutions or civil actions for conduct that was pardoned before enactment, provided state statute of limitations has not expired and the pardon was issued after the date of enactment.
(c) Pending Cases. For cases pending in federal court on the date of enactment in which a federal pardon has been issued under circumstances triggering this Act, such cases shall be remanded to state court immediately.
Section 9: Congressional Statement on Constitutional Authority
Congress declares that this Act is enacted pursuant to:
(1) Article I, Section 8 (powers vested in Congress); (2) The Tenth Amendment (reserved powers doctrine); (3) The constitutional duty of each branch to check abuse by other branches; (4) Congressional plenary authority to define immunity doctrines and federal preemption; (5) Congress's authority as a coordinate branch to respond to executive abuse of clemency power.
Section 10: Severability
If any provision is found unconstitutional by a court with jurisdiction to review it, that provision shall be severed and the remainder shall stand in full force and effect.
V. Why This Survives Constitutional Scrutiny
A. Congress's Explicit Constitutional Role as a Check on Executive Abuse—Not as a Limit on Presidential Power
The Constitution establishes separation of powers precisely so that when one branch's unilateral exercise of power creates a structural vacuum, other branches may respond through reallocation of responsibility and authority.
This Act does not limit the pardon power. It responds to the effects of the pardon.
When a president exercises clemency to extinguish federal accountability:
- Congress cannot and does not undo the pardon
- Congress cannot and does not reverse the pardon's effect on federal liability
- Congress cannot and does not condition the pardon's validity
- Congress CAN reallocate accountability responsibility to states
- Congress CAN eliminate federal judge-made doctrines that obstruct state enforcement
A presidential pardon eliminates federal criminal liability. It does not entitle the recipient to additional federal protections—secondary effects like immunity doctrines—beyond that elimination.
This is Congress controlling its own legal architecture, not the President's power.
B. The Pardon Is Unilateral and Unreviewable—Which Is Why Reallocation Is the Only Available Check
The pardon power is:
- Exercised by a single actor
- Immune from judicial review
- Immune from legislative veto
- Immune from reversal
The Constitution does not provide a traditional check (negation) on this power. Instead, the Constitution permits reallocation of responsibility.
When the President has unilaterally foreclosed federal accountability, Congress ensures that the Constitution retains a functioning accountability pathway. That pathway is the states.
This is separation of powers functioning correctly, not failing.
C. The Pardon Trigger Is an Evidentiary Marker, Not a Penalty
The pardon is used in this statute as a constitutional fact, not as a sanction.
It marks three constitutionally relevant conditions:
- Federal criminal accountability has been affirmatively extinguished (an irreversible executive act)
- Judicial review is unavailable by constitutional design
- Executive discretion over federal liability has been fully exercised
Once these conditions exist, Congress is constitutionally entitled—obligated, even—to ensure the Constitution still contains a functioning accountability mechanism.
Courts cannot honestly argue: "Congress must ignore the pardon and pretend it did not happen."
The pardon changes the constitutional landscape. Congress is allowed to respond to changed conditions. That is not punishment; that is structural rebalancing.
B. Immunity Elimination Is Legitimate Legislative Authority
Congress regularly defines when immunity exists:
- The Federal Tort Claims Act created exceptions to sovereign immunity
- The Civil Rights Act of 1871 pierced official immunity
- Section 1983 created federal causes of action against state officers
- Congress has repeatedly narrowed and expanded immunity doctrines
Congress declaring that Bivens immunity shall not apply to state prosecutions when a pardon has been issued is routine congressional authority over immunity doctrine.
Courts do not get to override this choice. Congress defines when federal immunity exists.
C. The Pardon-Triggered Mechanism Is Constitutionally Sound
This is not a blanket immunity elimination. This is a narrowly tailored response to a specific constitutional problem: presidential abuse of clemency.
The mechanism is proportionate: When federal accountability is eliminated through pardon, state accountability mechanisms activate.
The mechanism is structural: It uses Congress's legitimate authority (immunity definition) to check executive abuse (pardon overreach) while restoring state sovereignty (criminal/civil enforcement).
The mechanism is temporary and conditional: It exists only when a pardon is issued; it applies only to conduct for which the pardon was issued; it applies only to state law violations.
D. Federal Question Jurisdiction Remains Intact
Once Congress eliminates federal immunity doctrines in these circumstances:
- State courts apply state law
- Defendant cannot claim federal immunity
- State prosecution or civil action proceeds
- Federal courts have no federal question to review (state law in state court)
- Judicial review of federal questions persists everywhere else
Judicial review is not eliminated. Federal review of federal law persists. What is eliminated is federal judicial interference with state law enforcement through judge-made immunity doctrines.
E. The Supremacy Clause Is Honored
The Supremacy Clause applies where valid federal law exists. Congress has declared that federal immunity doctrines do not preempt state law in these circumstances. That is Congress exercising authority to define federal law's scope.
Congress's choice to NOT preempt is not a violation of the Supremacy Clause. It is an exercise of congressional authority to define federal law's boundaries.
E. The Pardon Power Itself Is Untouched
Congress does not limit the pardon power. The President can still pardon federal crimes. The pardoned officer still receives clemency for federal offenses. The pardon's validity is unquestioned. Its finality over federal liability is complete.
What changes is that the pardon no longer functions as a shield against state accountability because Congress has eliminated the secondary federal judge-made immunity doctrines that would make it so.
The pardon covers federal crimes only (which it always did). Immunity doctrines are independent legal constructs. Congress can eliminate one without touching the other.
This is not a limit on the pardon power. This is separation of powers: the Executive acts unilaterally (pardon); Congress responds by reallocating responsibility (immunity elimination); States exercise reserved power (enforcement).
That is the system functioning.
VI. Anticipated Judicial Counterarguments
A. "The Constitution Requires Federal Officer Immunity"
Response: The Supreme Court has never held this. Bivens itself acknowledged immunity doctrines are judge-created. Federal officers perform duties nationwide while subject to state criminal law; immunity is not constitutionally necessary. Congress can declare that immunity doctrines do not apply in state proceedings for state crimes. The Constitution does not forbid this.
B. "This Violates Separation of Powers"
Response: Congress exercising authority to check executive abuse of clemency IS separation of powers. Congress is a coordinate branch; when the Executive abuses power, Congress responds. Eliminating federal judge-made immunity doctrines in response to presidential abuse of clemency is precisely what separation of powers contemplates.
C. "The Supremacy Clause Prevents State Prosecution"
Response: The Supremacy Clause applies only where valid federal law exists. Congress has declared federal immunity does not preempt state law in these circumstances. That is Congress defining federal law's scope. Congress's choice to NOT preempt is constitutional authority, not violation.
D. "Federal Officers Cannot Perform Duties if Subject to State Prosecution"
Response: Federal officers perform duties in all 50 states while subject to state criminal law. They do so effectively. Federal immunity is not functionally necessary. Congress can eliminate it without impairing federal function.
E. "This Is Effectively a Pardon Power Limit"
Response: No. The pardon still applies to federal crimes. The President can still issue pardons. What changes is that pardons no longer shield from state liability. Congress is responding to pardon abuse by activating state accountability—a response within Congress's constitutional authority.
VII. Why This Is Stronger Than Direct Pardon Limits
Direct pardon limits would require:
- Constitutional amendment, or
- Declaring pardon power unconstitutional (impossible), or
- Stripping judicial jurisdiction (attacks courts)
This approach uses:
- Congressional authority to define immunity (well-established)
- Congressional authority to check executive abuse (constitutional duty)
- State sovereignty under Tenth Amendment (federalism foundation)
- Response to specific abuse (pardon weaponization)
This is constitutionally grounded, legislatively achievable, and cannot be repurposed for other ends without explicit congressional action.
VIII. Implementation and Political Strategy
A. Framing
This must be framed as:
- Constitutional check on executive abuse, not partisan attack
- Defense of federalism against federal judicial overreach
- Defense of state sovereignty
- Response to presidential weaponization of clemency
- Structural accountability restoration
B. State-Level Action
States should simultaneously:
- Enact complementary criminal statutes targeting conduct by federal officers (unlawful detention, civil rights violations, etc.)
- Prepare civil suits for damages
- Establish task forces to identify cases where pardons shield federal misconduct
C. Documentation
Congress should create a public record demonstrating:
- Pattern of presidential abuse of clemency
- Cases where state accountability was blocked by federal immunity doctrines
- Failures of federal prosecution and federal judicial review
- The resulting impunity
IX. Litigation Risk Appendix
A. Most Likely Successful Challenge
Argument: "Congress cannot condition exercise of federal immunity on state prosecution; some federal immunity is constitutionally required."
Statutory Response: Congressional findings establish that federal officers function effectively while subject to state law. This factual predicate undermines the constitutional necessity argument. Courts must accept Congress's factual findings unless clearly irrational.
Legislative Record Response: Congress creates a detailed record showing federal officers have historically been subject to state law and functioned effectively. This makes a constitutional immunity requirement impossible to defend.
B. Preemption Doctrine Challenge
Argument: "Federal authority necessarily preempts state prosecution when conduct relates to federal function."
Statutory Response: Section 3 explicitly negates any presumption of preemption. Congress has authority to define when federal law preempts state law. Congress has defined that it does not preempt here.
C. Federal Question Jurisdiction
Argument: "State prosecution of federal officers raises federal questions requiring federal oversight."
Statutory Response: Once Congress eliminates federal immunity doctrines, there is no federal law question about immunity. State courts apply state law. Federal constitutional questions remain available as defenses. There is no federal question requiring federal court review of state judgments.
D. Separation of Powers
Argument: "This violates separation of powers by Congress intruding on executive clemency authority."
Statutory Response: Congress does not intrude on clemency authority; the pardon still exists. Congress is exercising its own constitutional authority to check executive abuse. This IS separation of powers.
E. The Pardon Clause
Argument: "The Pardon Clause is absolute; Congress cannot condition its effects."
Statutory Response: The pardon IS absolute—the President can pardon federal crimes. What Congress conditions is federal immunity doctrine, which is not part of the pardon power. Pardons apply to federal crimes; immunity doctrines apply to federal courts. Congress can limit the latter without limiting the former.
X. Conclusion
The presidential pardon is a Article II power that Congress cannot directly limit. But when a president weaponizes clemency to shield federal officers from all accountability—federal and state—Congress possesses constitutional authority to respond as a coordinate branch.
Congress does this by eliminating the federal judge-made immunity doctrines that have made the pardon effective as a shield against state accountability. This is not an attack on the pardon power. This is Congress securing accountability mechanisms when the pardon threatens to eliminate them entirely.
When a president pardons federal crimes that violate state law, Congress declares that neither federal immunity doctrine nor federal judge-made supremacy doctrine shall prevent state prosecution or state civil liability. State accountability mechanisms activate. Federal judicial protection of federal officers from state law evaporates.
This restores constitutional balance:
- The Executive can pardon federal crimes (Article II authority preserved)
- Congress can respond to clemency abuse by securing state accountability (Article I authority exercised)
- States can enforce their own criminal and civil law (Tenth Amendment reserved power restored)
- Judges lose the power to use immunity doctrines to shield from accountability (judicial overreach corrected)
The pardon power remains supreme over federal liability. But the pardon power does not extend to shielding from state accountability when Congress has eliminated the judge-made federal doctrines that obstruct it.
Complete impunity—federal pardon plus federal immunity doctrines plus federal judicial protection—is not what the Constitution permits. Congress now ensures it does not occur.
Appendix: Constitutional Authority Summary
This Act is grounded in:
- Article I, Section 8: Congress possesses broad powers to legislate on federal authority, jurisdiction, and immunity
- The Tenth Amendment: Powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states
- Separation of Powers: Congress may check executive abuse of clemency through elimination of federal legal obstructions to state accountability
- Congressional Plenary Authority: Congress defines when federal immunity exists, when federal law preempts state law, and when federal jurisdiction extends
- Federalism: State criminal law and civil liability are core state powers that federal judge-made doctrines have unjustly obstructed
End of White Paper
